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Introduction
Since 2011, North Carolina has undertaken the stoutest, most en-
thusiastic war on poor people seen in the United States in the past half 
century.1  So it is no great surprise that the state boasts one of the more 
pervasive and ambitious user fee schemes in the country—much of it de-
veloped even before 2011—to purportedly pay for the operation of the 
criminal justice system and support the state treasury more broadly.2  There 
are court costs, attorney fees, lab fees, expert witness fees, probation fees, 
jail fees, community service fees, defendant monitoring fees, sheriff’s pen-
sion fees, law enforcement retirement fees, and failure to pay fees.  And 
more.  The list is long and Kafkaesque.  It frequently leads to levies of a 
thousand dollars or more for relatively modest offenses.  And, of course, it 
often triggers other ancillary punishments—even incarceration.3
1. See Gene R. Nichol, The Faces of Poverty in North Carolina: Conversations 
with our Invisible Citizens 158–74 (2018).
2. See Heather Hunt & Gene R. Nichol Jr., Court Fines and Fees: Criminalizing Pov-
erty in North Carolina, N.C. Poverty Res. Fund, Winter 2017, https://scholarship.
law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1443&context=faculty_publications.
3. Id. at 2–6; see also Cristina Becker, At All Costs: The Consequences of Rising 
Court Fines and Fees in North Carolina, ACLU N.C., 16–22 (2019), https://www.
acluofnorthcarolina.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/aclu_nc_2019_fines_
and_fees_report_17_singles_final.pdf.
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The poverty center where I work has done a couple of studies of 
the North Carolina fees program.4  Our colleagues at the North Carolina 
ACLU have examined the system as well.5  The results are perhaps un-
surprising to those who study this demoralizing field.  They were more of 
a jolt to me.  I was distressed to learn how few judges—even goodhearted 
ones—had ever heard of Bearden6 standards or of required ability to pay 
hearings.  It was also alarming to see how dramatically fee waivers and 
incarceration punishments vary from county to county and from judge to 
judge within counties or judicial districts.  Even if one believed in a user 
fee scheme—which I don’t—it would be impossible to justify its utter-
ly haphazard application.  Even worse, the fee system’s implementation 
often seems perverse—with the harshest, most unyielding regimes fre-
quently inflicted in the very poorest judicial districts.  Pervasive poverty 
seems to work against the granting of fee waivers rather than for them, 
trapping folks in an everdeepening cycle of inescapable hardship.7
I. Bullying Judges to Deny Waiver Requests
The North Carolina criminal justice defendant user fee scheme is 
(unfortunately) common in the United States.  But the state has now 
developed an ambitious enforcement/collection scheme which is perhaps 
singular.  The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that it is unconstitutional 
to incarcerate defendants because of their inability to pay court-ordered 
monetary obligations.8  To avoid that impermissible injustice and mod-
erate overarching economic hardship claims, judges are often allowed to 
waive or remit many fines and fees.  The North Carolina court fees law, 
N.C.G.S. sec. 7A-304, not only establishes most court fees, but also gov-
erns the ability of judges to waive them.
A very high percentage of North Carolina criminal defendants are 
indigent.  Nationally, the figure is 80–90 percent, and our poverty rate is 
far higher than those experienced in most states.9  Despite that, statewide, 
fewer than 5 percent of court-ordered monetary obligations are waived. 
In a third of North Carolina counties the waiver rate is plainly negligi-
ble, less than 2 percent.10  Still, since 2011, the North Carolina General 
Assembly has worked persistently to reduce these modest numbers.  In 
the process, legislators have pressed indigent defendants further into a 
4. See Hunt & Nichol, supra note 2; see also Gene Nichol & Heather Hunt, Forc-
ing Judges to Criminalize Poverty: Eroding Judicial Independence in North Car-
olina, N.C. Poverty Res. Fund, Fall 2018, https://www2.law.unc.edu/documents/
poverty/publications/judicialindependence_final.pdf [hereinafter Forcing Judg-
es to Criminalize Poverty].
5. See Becker, supra note 3.
6. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983) (limiting the power to jail crim-
inal defendants for failure to pay fees).
7. See Hunt & Nichol, supra, note 2, at 6–8, 15–16.
8. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73.
9. Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 5.
10. Id.
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crushing cycle of poverty.  They have also bullied judges and repeated-
ly threatened their independence.  The constitutional assault has arisen 
from multiple sources and for distinct purposes.
In 2011, the North Carolina court fees law was amended to apply 
various fees automatically, by default.  Judges wanting to waive such fees 
were then required to produce “a written finding of just cause” to support 
the decision.11  The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts 
(AOC), the state court system’s administrative body, was also ordered to 
maintain records of all cases in which court fees were waived and to file 
an annual report on the number of waivers granted.12  The General As-
sembly amended the law again in 2012 mandating that judges justify any 
decision to waive fees by presenting “findings of fact and conclusions of 
law” in support of the just cause requirement enacted the year before.13
Then they upped the ante.  In 2014, the General Assembly required 
that the annual AOC fee report be expanded to include a separate waiver 
listing for each judge and judicial district—including all waivers granted. 
Judges call it the “shaming report.”14  It is widely understood by local judicial 
officers as a way to control and intimidate them.  North Carolina judges are 
elected, and the annual report can be readily used to paint candidates as soft 
on crime.  When asked about the purpose of the report one Mecklenburg 
County judge said the goal is “to constrain judges in (their) decision-making 
process.”  Richard Boner, a retired Charlotte judge, asked “what purpose 
does it serve?  To embarrass people, I guess?”.15  But, he added:
They can put my name on a list if they want to, but I [am not] going 
to send people to jail if they [are] doing the best they [can] do, and 
for bad health or some other reason they couldn’t afford the pay-
ment.  That’s no better than a debtor’s prison.16
Former Durham County District Court Chief Judge (and current 
Democratic member of the House of Representatives) Marcia Morey 
added bluntly: “Evidently the legislators wanted to know who the ‘soft’ 
judges were that allowed people not to fork over money they did not 
have.”17  Judge Pat Devine fit the “shaming” scheme into a larger pattern:
There is no doubt that the legislature’s enforcement of fines and fees—
the pressure to not grant waivers—is part of a larger effort to control 
11. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2011, No. 
2011-145, § 15.10(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 253, 521.
12. Id. at § 15.10(b).
13. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2012, No. 
2012-142, § 16.6(b), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 484, 616.
14. Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 3.
15. Michael Gordon, His Sentence Carried No Jail Time.  So Why Did He Keep 
Ending up There?, The Charlotte Observer (Nov. 11, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article183866506.html 
[https://perma.cc/KE86-6KWL].
16. Id.
17. Marcia Morey, When Traffic Court Becomes Debtors’ Prison, The News & Observer 
(Apr. 24, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/community/
durham-news/dn-opinion/article72612127.html [https://perma.cc/A8PY-HUGC].
230 2020:227C J LR
judges.  It is part of a campaign to strip the judiciary of its independence.  
You make judges jump through a lot of hoops and you let them know 
someone is watching them.  It also can work to threaten their re-elec-
tions—claiming they are soft on crime.  The listing of waivers granted is 
a clear message to judges that Raleigh has its eye on them.  Someone in 
the legislature is keeping score.  The purpose of the whole scheme is to 
intimidate judges.  This is the clear politicization [of] our jobs.18
Lawmakers’ explanations for the odd report were more benign, 
even if less persuasive.  State Senator E.S. “Buck” Newton argued that:
If we see areas that have an unusually high amount [sic] of waivers, that 
might be useful for local justice officials to realize that they’re out of 
what might be the normal range.  That could be something the legislature 
might want to consider down the road if there appeared to be a problem.  
[The data is important] from a taxpayer’s protection standpoint.
State Senate criminal justice fee proponent Shirley Randleman 
said the efforts to clamp down on waivers are “all about revenue.”19
Judicial reaction to the shaming report was as likely anticipated.  In 
2017, the number of fee waivers fell by nearly half—from 87,006 in 2016 
to 45,882 the following year.  In 2018, the figure again fell precipitously, 
to just over 28,000.  Judges no doubt got the message.20
Still, North Carolina legislators remained unsatisfied.  In 2017, the 
legislature amended the fees law to prohibit any waiver unless “notice 
and an opportunity to be heard” was presented, by first class mail, to 
every government entity potentially receiving funds from court fees.21 
Potentially dozens or even hundreds of them—since the required linkage 
is unclear.  According to Mecklenburg County Chief District Judge Regan 
Miller, “(this) provision is designed to make the process so cumbersome 
that judges will elect to not waive costs.”22  Judge Marcia Morey char-
acterized the notice requirement as “tightening the screw to takeaway 
judicial discretion.”23  Cristina Becker, Criminal Justice Debt Fellow at 
the North Carolina ACLU, explained the likely results of the change:
To the judges that care about staying within the parameters of the 
Constitution, this will just clog up the courts; it will cost more money 
18. Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 2.
19. Joseph Neff, No Mercy for Judges Who Show Mercy, The Marshall Project 
(Nov. 29, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/29/no-
mercy-for-judges-who-show-mercy [https://perma.cc/2JB7-FGWU].
20. Becker, supra note 3, at 14.
21. Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017, No. 2017-57, § 18B.6.(a), 2017 
N.C. Sess. Laws 248, 563.
22. Melissa Boughton, House and Senate Differ over Budget Provision Making It 
Harder for Judges to Waive Fees for Poor Defendants, NC Policy Watch (June 
1, 2017), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2017/06/01/house-senate-differ-budget-
provision-making-harder-judges-waive-fees-poor-defendants [https://perma.cc/
ZTY7-XYAV].
23. Maura Ewing, A Judicial Pact to Cut Court Costs for the Poor, Atlantic (Dec. 
25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/court-fines-north- 
carolina/548960 [https://perma.cc/62G8-W5LD].
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for them, and I think it will cost more money than money that they 
would actually get back from poor defendants . . .  And then for the 
other judges who have basically just assumed the role of collector of 
debt for the state will find this refreshing that there’s an even better 
reason or another reason to not waive court costs.24
North Carolina’s trial courts have high volume dockets.  They dis-
posed of over 1.6 million criminal and traffic cases in fiscal year 2016–17.25 
Mecklenburg County (Charlotte) estimated that the notice requirement 
would be triggered in thousands of cases a week—“a huge increase and 
burden on an office already overburdened.”26  The notice rule also forces 
the court to schedule an additional hearing in the unlikely event that 
a notified entity chooses to appear.  The Administrative Office of the 
Courts understated in claiming that the notice demand “poses numerous 
operational difficulties for our criminal courts.”27  The notice requirement 
is believed to be the first of its kind in the country.28
The goal of the detailed findings requirement, the shaming report 
and the absurd notice standard is clear.  The North Carolina General As-
sembly effectively tells the trial judges of the state: You have the power 
to issue waivers in cases of potent economic hardship, but if you use it, we 
will punish you.  We will visit massive procedural hurdles upon you.  We 
will publish your name on a blacklist that can be used against you come 
election time.  If, on the other hand, you deny a requested waiver, we will 
smile, nod our studied approval, and let you go your way in peace.  We 
thus place a thumb on the scales of justice.  We do so for a reason.  We 
don’t want judges to grant waivers.  Wise up, your honors, or pay the cost.
24. Boughton, supra note 22.
25. Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 7.
26. Id. at 7–8.
27. Jonathan Harris, N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, New Fee Waiver Provi-
sion in the 2017 Appropriations Act 4 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nccourts.
gov/assets/documents/publications/Fee_Waiver_Memo_w_attachments.pdf?nx-
KvQXSILwVJYRYbiGnnCo2gzDydbr7s [https://perma.cc/4RGA-536S].
28. Neff, supra note 19; see also Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, 
at 8.  The North Carolina General Assembly’s most recent change to the criminal 
court fees laws continues the apparent hostility to waiver.  In November 2017, the 
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) launched a plan to ease the adminis-
trative burden on judges by sending a monthly blanket notice to all government 
entities who stood to receive funds from court fees.  This proposed step would re-
lieve judges from having to do the same in every case in which they were consider-
ing waiver.  In January 2018, the AOC announced the creation of a central registry 
of government responses that would allow each agency to lodge a standing objec-
tion to waiver or to opt out of receiving notices in future, thus notably streamlin-
ing the process.  The General Assembly was apparently dissatisfied with such pro-
cedural efficiency.  So they required the legislative staff to investigate the AOC 
plan.  This was initiated, according to Senator Warren Daniel, “to make sure” the 
AOC is “complying with the spirit of the provision.”  As a result of this investiga-
tion, the lawmakers again modified the waiver provision in 2018.  Beginning Octo-
ber 1, 2018, the AOC was required to submit an annual report, “on the implemen-
tation of the notice of waiver of costs to the government entities directly affected.” 
Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 9.
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II. Judicial Independence and Separation of Powers
I have little doubt that the North Carolina fee waiver scheme—the 
shaming and burdening regime—should be held to violate our consti-
tutions, state and federal.  Article I, Section 6 of the North Carolina 
Constitution states: “the legislative, executive and supreme judicial pow-
ers of State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each 
other.”29  Article IV, Section 1 adds that the “General Assembly shall 
have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or juris-
diction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the 
government.”30  Reasserting judicial integrity would be a good start.
Those provisions were given further elucidation just last year in 
Cooper v. Berger.31  There, the North Carolina Supreme Court indicat-
ed that two types of legislative acts violate the separation of powers 
principle: when lawmakers exercise “power that the constitution vests 
exclusively in another branch,” or when they “prevent another branch 
from performing its constitutional duties.”32  The waiver restrictions and 
impediments seem to violate the second norm.  Judges are given a job to 
do, but they are hobbled by legislative interference from appropriately 
carrying it out.  Judges have a constitutional duty to determine defen-
dants’ ability to pay fines and fees and to waive costs if a defendant is 
indigent—rather than allowing them to be punished for their poverty.33 
The North Carolina General Assembly has boldly and repeatedly deter-
mined to make that necessary task harder to accomplish.
At least one notable federal constitutional precedent, however, 
strikes even closer to home.  In 2003, the United States Congress passed 
the Feeney Amendment to the Sentencing Reform Act.34  The goal of the 
change was to limit the growing tendency of federal judges to deviate from 
the then-mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.  The Feeney Amend-
ment aimed at “downward departures” by which a judge, upon considering 
mitigating factors, was permitted to hand down a shorter sentence than the 
guidelines instructed.  Upward departures, curiously, were left unmolested.35
The Feeney Amendment forced federal judges to submit in writing 
the specific reasons for imposing a downward departure.  It established 
a mechanism to scrutinize individual judges’ decisions—requiring courts 
to detail the basis for sentencing reductions and to include the offend-
ing judge’s name along with the sentence imposed to the Sentencing 
29. N.C. Const. art. I, § 6.
30. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1.
31. Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98, 111 (N.C. 2018).
32. Berger, supra note 31, at 111 (quoting State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 781 S.E.2d 
248, 256 (N.C. 2016)).
33. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 660; Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
34. Enacted as part of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Ex-
ploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 [here-
inafter PROTECT Act of 2003].
35. Id.
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Commission.36  In theory, the information was to be gathered only for 
data collection and exploration purposes.  The Attorney General of the 
United States was also required to submit a report to the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees describing any case presenting a downward 
departure, setting forth the facts of the case and the name of the presid-
ing judge.37  Shades of the North Carolina “shaming report.”
Feeney ignited a storm of protest.  The Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the American Bar Association, current and former mem-
bers of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, legal academics, and prosecutors 
and defense attorneys issued public denunciations of the amendment.38 
Critics cited the intimidation of judges as an egregious violation of ju-
dicial independence.39  One antagonist held nothing back—calling the 
reporting requirement a “judicial blacklist” that directly infringes the ap-
propriate separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary.40 
The late Senator Edward Kennedy called the demanded report “the lat-
est salvo” in an “ongoing attack on judicial independence and fairness.”41
One federal judge, John S. Martin, resigned in protest.42  Another 
deployed the “Statement of Reasons for Imposing Sentence” as a de-
manded desideratum:
Congress and the Attorney General have instituted policies designed to 
intimidate and threaten judges into refusing to depart downward, and 
those policies are working.  If the Court were to depart, the Assistant 
U.S. Attorney would be required to report that departure to the U.S. At-
torney, who would in turn be required to report to the Attorney General.  
The Attorney General would then report the departure to Congress, 
and Congress could call the undersigned to testify and attempt to justify 
the departure.  This reporting requirement system accomplishes its goal: 
the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to depart.43
Chief Justice William Rehnquist—a supporter of reduced down-
ward departures—publicly castigated the amendment, calling it “an 
unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in 
36. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, sec. 401(h), 117 Stat. 650, 672.
37. Id.
38. Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 14–15.
39. Ian Urbina, New York’s Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. Times 
(Dec. 8, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/08/nyregion/new-york-s-feder-
al-judges-protest-sentencing-procedures.html [https://perma.cc/YPQ4-WFTR].
40. Alan Vinegrad, The Judiciary’s Response to the PROTECT ACT, 231 N.Y.  L.J. 1 
(2004).
41. Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. to Monitor Judges for Sentences Shorter Than Guide-
lines Suggest, N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/08/us/
justice-dept-to-monitor-judges-for-sentences-shorter-than-guidelines-suggest.
html [https://perma.cc/N6J8-DP4H].
42. Forcing Judges to Criminalize Poverty, supra note 4, at 15; see also Lichtblau, supra 
note 41 (“John S. Martin, a federal district judge in Manhattan who announced in 
June that he would retire in part because he saw the judiciary’s independence as 
threatened, said the Justice Department policy was ‘based on the erroneous prem-
ise that a lot of judges around the county are just going off the reservation.’”).
43. United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006–7 (D. Minn. 2003).
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the performance of their judicial duties.”44  Rehnquist explicitly worried 
over the Feeney Amendment’s threat to judicial independence and its 
introduction of politics into judicial decisionmaking.45
The U.S. Supreme Court as a whole never directly addressed Feeney’s 
constitutional propriety.  A federal district court did, though, in U.S. v. Men-
doza.46  There, the judge ruled that the reporting requirement, though not 
giving Congress direct power over the federal judiciary, posed a “threat, real 
or apparent, (that) is blatantly present.”47  There is “no legitimate purpose 
served by reporting an individual judge’s performance to Congress,”48 the 
Court declared.  The Amendment, instead, constituted a “power grab by one 
branch of government over another branch.”49  As a result, it was deemed 
to present an  “unwarranted interference with judicial independence and 
a clear violation of the separation of powers set forth in the United States 
Constitution.”50  The court didn’t seem to think it was close call.
Conclusion
The Feeney Amendment was effectively rendered moot by the 
Supreme Court’s decision declaring the relevant components of the 
Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.51  But the in-
appropriately intrusive Feeney Amendment tracks the North Carolina 
“shaming report” in telling ways.  As with Feeney, North Carolina judges 
are required explain and support their waivers in writing.  Judges are 
then forced to share that information with the legislature, and the popu-
lation at large.  An assumedly unpopular determination (granting waiver 
to an impoverished criminal defendant) is publicly linked to judges sub-
ject to political or electoral retaliation.  Legislators no doubt believe this 
will intimidate judicial “generosity.”  It also surely deters constitutional 
compliance and judicial independence.  Judges attest that the reporting 
regime has a stifling effect on their decisionmaking.  Waiver data bears 
the suspected suppression out.  Judges who waive court fees are punished 
with administrative burden and political risk.  Those who deny waivers 
are left unhindered.  A potent hand is thus placed on the scale of justice. 
Unsurprisingly, today, in North Carolina, the intervention is directed at 
the poor and vulnerable, and any judge who might seek to assure constitu-
tional parity.  Equal justice under law again requires a qualifying asterisk.
44. Rehnquist Criticizes Sentencing Restrictions, L.A. Times (Jan. 2, 2004), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jan-02-na-rehnquist2-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KF5E-THUS].
45. Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack On Federal Judicial 
“Leniency,” The Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Justice 
Sentencing, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 519, 544 (2009).
46. United States v. Mendoza, No. CR 03-730 DT, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Mendoza, supra note 46, at 21.
51. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
